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Lack of audit quality and subsequent audit failures result mainly from a lack 
of independence which is considered to be a consequence of the extended 
auditor client relationship. Actually, the results of a questionnaire distrib-
uted among auditors in Egypt confirm this hypothesis: The Auditors strongly 
agree that there is a lack of auditor independence in Egypt. The main rea-
son is that most of the companies are closely held and that there is a lack of 
existence of code of ethics for auditing practitioners in Egypt. Also, the re-
sults indicate that the mostly accepted solution by the auditors to overcome 
the lack of independence problem is the mandatory auditor rotation. Conse-
quently, the paper suggests that mandatory firm rotation instead of manda-










1.  Introduction 
The audit quality is one of the most significant topics in the auditing profession. It is defined as the 
auditor being capable of detecting and reporting material misstatements existing in the sample being 
investigated during the audit process (Vanstraelen, 2000).  As the auditor is able to detect and report on the 
existing material misstatements, the audit process is considered as more effective and of a higher quality.  
What might hinder the auditor’s ability to perform at a high level of conduct to provide a high quality is the 
extended auditor client relationship (Hamilton, 2005). Actually, it was found that the extended auditor-client 
relationship as defined by the auditor tenure would psychologically impair the auditor independence; a matter 
which causes the auditor not to be able to perform with full objectivity and non-biasness (Sori and Karbhari, 
2005). 
A sound solution that has been proposed and applied in different countries, in order to overcome the 
problem of the lack of auditor independence, is the mandatory auditor rotation. The mandatory rotation 
practice imposes on every listed company to change its audit firm or at least its audit partner after a certain 
period of time (Arel et al. 2005). Changing the auditor (whether audit partner or audit company) is said to be 
necessary and even required by law in different countries for mainly two reasons; first, in order to maintain 
the auditor independence which otherwise would be eroded due to the personal attachments between the 
client. Second, is to enhance the audit quality through promoting the creativity in audit testing approaches and 
methods which  might be restricted due to increased familiarity with the client and staleness in performing the 
audit (Carey and Simnett, 2006).  
Egypt is also experiencing the lack of auditor independence due to some deficiencies in the Egyptian 
Auditing Standards (EAS) and due to other reasons such as the lack of existence of professional organizations 
for promoting the auditing profession in Egypt and that most of the companies operating in Egypt are closely 
held (Wahdan et al. 2005a;Wahdan et al. 2005b). As the mandatory auditor rotation, whether partner or firm 
rotation, has been applied in different countries, this paper proposes the application of the mandatory auditor 
rotation in Egypt as a solution for the lack of independence problem and as a way that to enhance the audit 
quality. 
This paper intends to identify the main the reasons for the lack of independence in Egypt, and how 
this serious problem could be overcome. Also, the paper discusses whether the audit tenure improves or 
deteriorates the audit quality, what the main reasons for a voluntarily change of the auditors are, and, finally, 
which form of mandatory rotation would be suitable for the Egyptian economical environment. These 
questions are answered using a survey distributed among audit practitioners in Egypt, where the questionnaire 
results were analyzed with SPSS. 2 
 
In the next chapter, the paper will present a literature review concerning three main aspects: The 
auditor rotation, the problem of the auditor independence, and the audit quality. The third chapter will 
introduce the model and the discussed hypotheses, followed by the data analysis and a presentation of the 
findings in chapter four and the conclusion in the final chapter five. 3 
 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1. The Auditor Rotation 
The idea of the auditor rotation was first introduced and discussed in 1976 (Hoyle, 1986). Auditor 
rotation can either be mandatory or voluntary.  The mandatory rotation pushes all types of firms to change 
their auditors after a fixed duration (Lu, 2005) while the voluntary rotation is the optional switching of the 
auditors (Davidson et al., 2005). Actually mandatory rotation could be either through the audit-firm rotation 
which requires listed companies to change or rotate their audit firms after a specific period of time (almost 
five years) or through the audit-partner rotation instead, which requires listed companies to change or rotate 
their audit lead partner who is responsible for the audit decisions on the engagement after a specific period of 
time (Arel et al. 2005; Orin, 2008). On the other hand the voluntary rotation is mainly based on the 
management decisions and choice regardless of time (Davidson et al., 2005). 
Proponents of the auditor rotation see that the mandatory rotation first, bounds opinion shopping 
practices by limiting its opportunities (Lu, 2005). Second, it is considered very informative to the outsiders, 
since the successor auditor gets information from his predecessor who helps him in assessing the firm’s 
financial conditions (Lu, 2005). At the same time this will improve the work of the audit firms/partners  as 
they know that sometime in the future their work will be reviewed by another audit firm or partner when they 
are rotated  (Raiborn et al., 2006; Davis et al., 2009).  Third, the rotation also provides a new insight to the 
client's financial statements (Davis et al., 2009; Raiborn et al., 2006) since the auditing practice is based on 
employing professional skepticism and the long term attachment with the client and working for long years 
for the same client can reduce the sharpness of his professional judgment (Wolf, 1999; Nagy, 2005). Fourth, 
the mandatory rotation helps in enhancing the competition in the audit market, thus small companies (NON 
BIG FOUR) are encouraged to grow and develop more niche specialization as the rotation puts all audit firms 
on the same level and gives them equal opportunities (Raiborn et al., 2006). Finally it was found that both 
auditors and clients suffer great losses in case of an audit failure and that the cost of auditor rotation would be 
less than the cost of excessive litigation and loss of reputation resulting from such audit failures, actually it 
was found that the auditor rotation costs $1.2 billion/year as compared to $460 billion loss in market capital 
due to audit failures of Enron, Tico and Worldcom (Cameran et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2007).   
On the other hand, opponents to the auditor rotation found that first; the rotation is of no use, since the 
excessive litigations that could be faced by the auditor would force them to struggle to preserve their 
reputation (Davis et al., 2009). Second, mandatory rotation will increase the switching and start up costs to 
both the auditors and the clients (Davis et al., 2009), that when an auditor is engaged with a new client, the 
first year start-up cost to that auditor is large as the audit process will be more time- and effort- consuming 
than with existing clients due to the creation of the learning curve (Davis et al., 2009). As a result auditor fees 4 
 
charged by the auditor will increase, so as to absorb the high cost of audit, thus the cost increases for the client 
as well (Wolf, 1999; Johnson et al., 2002).  Actually, it was found by the GAO that audit cost was 17% of the 
total audit fees of the first year audit (Jackson et al., 2008). Finally, auditors normally interact with the 
company’s management daily during the audit process, an issue that makes them more attached to them 
regardless the amount of time spent or the audit tenure (Arel et al., 2005). 
 
It could be inferred that the main debate raised around the auditor rotation is whether it improves or 
deteriorates the audit quality. The proponents of the auditor rotation concept see that the main purpose of the 
rotation is that the auditor tenure can negatively impact the audit quality where the auditor tenure increases 
the auditor lack of independence and the auditors become lax in their audit of a company’s financial reporting 
(Kim et al., 2007; Lu. 2005). Also a financial bond is created where the client is changed to be a source of a 
continuous (perpetual) annuity to the auditor, and the auditor is not willing to lose such a source of revenue. If 
the rotation is mandatory and the auditor knows that he will not sustain the client forever, the present value of 
expected future benefits from the auditor-client relationship to the auditor decreases thus reducing incentives 
for dependency and non-objectivity (Ghosh and Moon, 2004; Schelker, 2007; Wolf, 1999; Raiborn et al., 
2006; Jackson et al., 2008; Nagy, 2005; Davis et al., 2008). Moreover, after the application of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) which imposed the rotation of the auditor every five years, it was found that non 
GAAP earnings management practices have declined, an issue that reflects that when the auditor spends 
longer tenure with the client, he/she would not allow their managing of their reported earnings practices 
(Davis et al., 2009). 
 
On the other hand, the opponents to the rotation found that it would reduce the audit quality. Actually, 
the auditor tenure would positively affect the audit quality, that an audit failure would occur more for new 
clients due to having less information about such clients. In order for the auditor to conduct a good audit he 
has to have enough knowledge about the company’s operations, accounting system and internal controls in 
order to be able to detect material misstatements. That is why it is said that the auditor independence and 
thereafter the audit quality increases as auditor experience increases over time and as he becomes more 
acquainted with the client’s system (Ghosh and Moon, 2004). 
In the coming section of the paper, the audit quality and the different proxies of how it could be 
measured will be defined, in addition to the assessed impact of the rotation on each. 
2.2. The Audit Quality 
  Audit quality is defined as "the probability that an auditor will both discover and report a breach in 
the client's accounting system. The probability of discovering a breach depends on the auditor's technical 5 
 
capabilities while the probability of reporting the errors depends on the auditor's independence" (Vanstraelen, 
2000; Deis and Giroux, 1992; De Angelo, 1981). This definition doesn't only reflect the auditor's compliance 
with the reporting standards and fieldwork standards of the GAAS, but also the degree of the auditor's 
independence in being able to face the client with his reporting mistakes not fearing to lose him on the current 
or the potential future engagements. Thus it can be inferred that the auditor's independence is part of the audit 
quality. Before discussing the model used in the assessment of the audit quality, the reasons for the lack of 
auditor independence in Egypt that would result in a lack of quality should be explained first. 
The Reasons for the Lack of Auditor's Independence in Egypt 
•  The auditors’ work and practice is not governed through a code of ethics in Egypt. Although the 
Syndicate of Law no. 40 for the year 1972 discusses and highlights the legal requirements especially 
those concerning fraud, some auditors and accountants ignore this code and also there is little attention 
among the practitioners concerning some issues such as the auditor’s independence, the conflict of 
interest and the auditor-client relationship (Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
 
•  There is no separation between the auditing and the other management advisory services that auditors 
are sometimes hired as tax advisors and go more for tax minimization than for ensuring that sound 
accounting policies are adopted (Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
 
•  The auditors should normally be paid and hired by the shareholders or as sometimes called the third 
party; however in Egypt, auditors suffer from the problem of closely held companies which means that 
the shareholders also assume the role of the management. This problem leaves the auditor faced with the 
conflict of interest between his fairness and the audit fees (Wahdan et al. 2005b). This is in addition to 
that the directors of some companies invite the auditors to attend the regular meetings of the BOD and 
receive compensations after the end of each meeting (Wahdan et al., 2005a). 
 
•   The lack of the independence problem is also noticed from the Egyptian Auditing Standards (EAS). 
In a comparison which was made between the GAAS (The Generally Accepted Auditing Standards) and 
the EAS, it was found that the latter lacks very important basics that exist in GAAS for enhancing the 
auditor independence. First, in the EAS, the auditor's report is titled "The Auditor's Report" without any 
reference to the degree of independence of such an auditor. This actually is opposed to the GAAS which 
requires the stating of the word “independent” to stress on the auditor's fairness, objectivity and un-
biasness. Second, according to the EAS, the auditor report could be addressed to the board of directors 
(BOD), investors, stockholders or to the management. However, in the GAAS, the auditor report should 
not be addressed to the management (except in the case of an internal audit) as this opposes the 6 
 
independence criteria that should be considered by the auditor. Third, concerning the issuance of a 
disclaimer audit opinion; in the EAS, an auditor can disclaim his opinion either when there is a scope 
restriction by the client in providing an amount a highly material piece of information or when there is a 
scope restriction by circumstances (Ibrahim, 2008, Arens et al., 2001). Only these two reasons are stated 
by the EAS to allow an auditor to issue a disclaimer opinion, however a very important reason which is 
stated as one of the disclaimer conditions in the GAAS is the lack of auditor independence; such as 
having a direct financial interest in the auditee, having a post or providing a management advisory service 
to the auditee (Arens et al., 2001).  
 
None of these conditions actually exist in the EAS 200, an issue that indicates that the auditor 
independence is not a concern of the EAS and that also means that the auditing profession in Egypt is 
lacking its corner stone which is the independence of the auditor. It could be deduced then that the auditor 
rotation is mainly advocated in the Egyptian auditing and regulatory society so as to sustain the degree of 
the auditor independence.  7 
 
3.  The Model and the Hypotheses 
There are different measures or as called proxies of the audit quality. In this paper, six different 
proxies will be used, these are; the audit report, the audit report lag, the auditor experience, the 
auditor reputation, the audit report lag, the auditor fees and the level of earnings management. 
These factors were chosen as they are the most widely used in the literature and the mostly used in 
empirical studies of assessing the impact of the rotation on the quality and the most relevant and 
covering all the other factors as well, (Jackson et al., 2008; Lennox, 1998 Geiger et al, 2002; 
Meyer et al., 2007;Lowensohn et al. 2007; Knechel et al., 2007; Roberts et al., 1990 Gul et al., 
2007;  Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 2008; Davidson et al., 2005) 
3.1. Auditor Report 
A company’s financial statements are considered the means to communicating and passing financial 
information to a third party. Concerning the impact of the auditor rotation on the audit opinion, it was found 
that managers rotate their auditors in order to avoid the receipt of a qualified opinion. However if the auditor 
accepts to give a clean report he will not be rotated, but if the incumbent auditor is more likely to provide a 
qualified opinion, the client might terminate the engagement (Jackson et al., 2008; Lennox, 1998). Also, 
according to Vanstraelen (2000), the long audit tenure decreases the auditor's willingness to qualify his audit 
opinion due to the personal attachment that arises with the client, thus the mandatory rotation should be 
suggested to avoid the collusion between the management and the auditor.  
On the other hand, it was proved that when the tenure increases, the auditor's judgment is improved 
to give the appropriate audit opinion, this means that mandatory rotation will deteriorate the audit quality by 
limiting the tenure not the opposite (Carey and Simnett, 2006, Jackson et al., 2008). Also, there was no 
relation found between the extended auditor tenure and the removal of a going concern qualification from 
the audit opinion that means that neither the auditor’s judgment nor his independence was affected by the 
long tenure (Meyer et al., 2007; and Knechel and Vanstraelen 2007). 
In this paper the audit opinion is considered an indicator of the audit quality if the auditor was 
successful in issuing the appropriate audit opinion. However the appropriate audit opinion sometimes might 
not be appreciated by the company management if it includes a qualification. Thus they decide to switch their 
auditor searching for another one who might give them an unqualified opinion. From here the first hypothesis 
is developed. 
H1: The auditor will be rotated if he didn't issue a standard unqualified audit opinion. 
 8 
 
3.2. Auditor's Reputation 
The auditor reputation is important for the audit quality as it is well known among companies that 
reputable auditors perform a high quality audit and their audit opinion concerning the appropriateness of the 
financial statements is more reliable (Krishnamurthy et al., 2006). When a sample of Arthur Anderson (AA) 
clients were investigated as whether the auditor's reputation impacts the market perception of audit quality, it 
was found that the decreased reputation means the impairment of the auditor independence which will 
adversely affect the audit quality. When the firm announced that AA is replaced by one of the NON BIG 
FOUR, the market return was negatively affected which in return had affected the company’s value and stock 
price (Krishnamurthy et al. 2006). Also it was found that the BIG FOUR have more tendency to report 
earnings misstatements as it was found that BIG FOUR report more frequent accounting irregularities and 
financial reporting malpractices than NON BIG FOUR (Davidson et al., 2005).  
In this paper, the auditor reputation is considered a measure of the audit quality, as the reputation 
increases, the audit quality increases. Thus a client company which wants to promote the audit quality would 
change from a less reputable audit firm to a more reputable audit firm.  
H2: The auditor will be rotated if it is a Non Big Four audit firm 
3.3. Auditor Experience 
It was found that the brand name (high reputation) of an audit firm is not enough to promote the audit 
quality, but the industry knowledge and specialization is an important part of the auditor’s experience. As the 
auditor’s knowledge and experience with a client’s industry the auditor is more able to detect potential 
material misstatements and to put basis and hypotheses for industry specific routine errors (Knechel et al., 
2007).  Moreover,  it was found that the auditor's experience in detecting material misstatements decline when 
they spend longer tenure with their clients, that they rely on their previous experience with the client rather 
than exerting more effort (Meyer et al., 2007),  an issue that would suggest the mandatory rotation as a 
solution to overcome such staleness.  
 Since the auditor’s experience is an indicator a of a high quality as it increases, in this paper it is 
assessed whether a client company will switch to a more experienced one in order to promote the audit 
quality. This is hypothesized as follows.  
H3: The auditor will be rotated if he has few years of experience in the client's firm industry (i.e. specialized 
in the client's business). 
 9 
 
3.4. Earnings Management 
Earnings management is the choice of the adoption of certain accounting policies in order to achieve 
managers’ specific objectives. They are considered important pieces of information released by the company. 
Such earnings are considered of poor quality if they don’t give a true image for the company's value and 
financial position. The main factor affecting the level of earnings management practice is the auditor tenure. It 
was found that there is a negative relation between the auditor tenure and the extent of the earnings 
management practices, that the longer the auditor tenure, the more familiar the auditor is with the clients 
‘reporting systems, thus the more material misstatements or unexplained adjustments in the financial 
statements are detected (Ebrahim ,2001). However, on the other hand, it was found that sometimes there is a 
positive relationship between the auditor tenure and the level of earnings management, that when the auditor 
tenure increases, his independence is impaired due to the excessive familiarity and personal attachment with 
the client. In addition, this would make the auditor’s work more routine and systematic, as he would devote 
less effort in detecting the material misstatements and the irrelevant reporting practices. Supporting to this, it 
was found that the auditor is more likely to detect material misstatements in earlier years of the engagement, 
then such capability decreases gradually for the following twenty years of engagement (Piot and Ganin, 2005; 
Davis et al., 2000). That’s why a good auditor should be independent to be able to investigate a company 
management's financial reporting practices and to be able to find whether they follow GAAP through 
checking on their earning management practices (Davis et al., 2000) 
In this paper, the degree of allowance of earnings management practices is used as a measure of 
quality. As when the auditor allows more earnings management practices which are favored by the client 
company, the audit quality is said to be impaired as the auditor is not following the consistent application of 
GAAP. Thus it is assessed from the following hypothesis, as whether the auditor will be changed if he/she 
didn’t approve such practices. 
 H4: The auditor will be rotated if he didn't approve the client's reporting practices. 
3.5. Audit Report Lag (ARL) 
The ARL is defined as" the period from the company's yearend date to the audit report date" (Lai and 
Cheuk, 2005; Krishman and Yang, 2009). It was found that there is a negative relationship between the value 
of the financial statements to the investors and the time taken to prepare them (Lai and Cheuk, 2005). 
Although the delay in filing the company's financial statements would be an indicator of low quality of 
financial and audit reporting, sometimes the auditor needs more time for assessment  to make sure that the 
company's financial statements are free from material misstatements. This reflects that when the auditor is 
more independent, he is more devoted with time and effort to detect material misstatements and that would 10 
 
lead to a longer ARL (Scholoetzer, 2006).  Moreover, it was found that the audit report lag is affected by the 
auditor rotation decision which in return would affect the audit quality .Actually the ARL depends on two 
factors, the timing of the auditor rotation and the type of auditor rotation, that a shorter ARL is expected in 
early audit firm rotation since at the beginning of the year there is enough time to help the successor auditor to 
perform audit smoothly rather than when the rotation occurs later in the year (Lai and Cheuk , 2005). Also 
according to Lai et al. (2005), it was found that there is a positive and strong association between cross-up 
audit firm rotation and the ARL while there is a negative relationship between the cross-down audit firm 
rotation and ARL .This would reflect that when a client rotates from a NON BIG FOUR to a BIG FOUR 
audit firm, it takes longer time to submit the audit opinion and that  it is not the client but the audit firm’s 
specific factors related to the degree of the audit effectiveness that influences the audit process  (Knechel and 
Payne , 2001; Lai et al., 2005), when such a level of effectiveness is achieved neither the excessive audit 
hours spent nor the extra audit effort exerted will add to the overall audit quality (Krishman and Yung, 2009) 
In this paper, due to the importance of the audit report timeliness as a measure of the audit quality, will 
the company try to switch its auditor who provided less timely opinion to those who would provide a timelier 
audit opinion; this is reflected in the following hypothesis. 
 
H5: The auditor will be rotated if he produces an audit report lag 
3.6. Auditor Fees 
There are many reasons that cause a positive relationship between the auditor fees and the audit 
quality. Actually more investigation and audit procedures will require more audit hours ,higher cost due to 
the use of more experienced and specialized staff and thus,  higher audit  fees (O’Sullivan, 2000; Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz, 2008). On the hand, large audit fees paid by the client make the auditor more economically 
dependent on the client, thus it forces the auditor to be more reluctant in inquiring the client during the audit 
as fearing from losing him.  After the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), total fees to audit firms have increased 
indicating that total revenues from audit clients will increase after the SOX rotation decision. That is 
actually due to the increased litigation an auditor would be exposed to, consequently, the auditor will exert 
more effort and time and this will dictate on him increasing his audit fees required and thereafter, the quality 
(Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 2008). 
 In this paper, the auditor’s fees is considered a measure for the assessment of the audit quality, as it is 
assumed that high audit fees reflects a high quality especially if the audit is performed by a reputable audit 
firm. Thus, will a client company decide to switch its auditor if he/she required high fees. This is reflected in 
the following hypothesis 11 
 
H6: The auditor will be rotated if he requires large audit fees 
After the determination of the different proxies of audit quality, the paper will now move to the part 
of the study related to assessment of whether the auditor rotation concept is applicable to Egypt, i.e whether 
the professionals in the field see that the rotation is really needed in Egypt and whether it will improve the 
quality as assessed per the previously discussed proxies.  
 
Rotation as a concept has been applied in different counties, the USA, Korea, Italy, France, 
Singapore and Taiwan to overcome the problem of the lack of auditor independence. Egypt as a country has 
experienced large business failures and bankruptcies associated with audit failures since the 80s of the last 
century. The main reason behind it, as will be discussed in the following lines, is due to the lack of auditor 
independence suffered by the profession in Egypt. According to Eli et al. (2005), the higher the auditor 
independence, the higher the audit quality as the information asymmetry between the management and the 
third party is reduced. In Egypt the lack of independence problem is either due to the weak enforcement of 
the regulation and litigation or due to the deficiencies in the Egyptian Auditing Standards (EAS)  
 12 
 
4.  Data Analysis and Findings 
A self-made questionnaire has been used in this paper and distributed among auditors in Egypt to know 
their evaluation concerning the current practice of the voluntary rotation of the auditors and whether it is for 
the improvement of the audit quality. This is in addition to assessing the extent of the lack of auditor 
independence problem in Egypt and the extent of the feasibility of the application of mandatory rotation as 
well as the suitable type of the mandatory rotation to be applied. The questionnaire is designed based on the 
Likert Scale model with 5 columns of choice; “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, “Neutral”, “Disagree”, “Strongly 
Disagree” (1) represents strongly agree and (5) represents strongly disagree.  The Questionnaire was 
distributed among 50 auditors who were randomly selected from two of the big four audit firms in Cairo, 
Egypt. The two firms were Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) and Ernest and Young. Of this sample, only 31 




The frequencies in Figure 1 show that 82.2% of the participants agree and strongly agree that as the 
auditor spends more years auditing the same client, the audit quality is improved. On the other hand, only 
17.8% of the participants agree and strongly agree that the long audit tenure negatively affects the audit 
quality. 
 
From the mean results, it could be concluded that the long tenure increases the audit quality as it has an 
average of 2.0. While, the majority was disagreeing towards the concept that the extended tenure deteriorates 
and decreases the audit quality as its mean was approximately 3.36. This means that the respondents support 
the concept that extended tenure improves the audit quality due to increased experience rather than supporting 
that the extended tenure deteriorates the audit quality due to the increased financial and psychological 





From Figure 2, it was found that more than 50% of the participants agree and strongly agree that the 
reason of the lack of auditor independence is that companies operating in Egypt are closely held meaning that 
the owners or the shareholders are the managers of the company. Also it was found that 56% of the 
participants agree and strongly agree that the lack of a code of ethics would be a cause for the lack of 
independence problem in Egypt. It was found that 71% agree and strongly agree that it was the shortage in 
existence of professional organization. Also 36% agree and strongly agree that the management's authority in 
being able to hire and fire auditors is a reason for the lack of independence in Egypt. However it was found 
that 48.1% agree and strongly agree that the provision of non-audit services or the provision of MAS would 
impair the auditor's independence. Finally, 71.4% of the participants agree and strongly agree that having 
financial interest in the client's company affects the auditor's independence. From the mean analysis to 
investigate and rank the six suggested causes selected from the literature, it was found that the most agreed 
upon by the majority was the lack of professional organizations with a mean of 2.19. Second, comes the 
problem that most of the companies operating in Egypt are closely held with a mean of  2.36. Next in the rank 
is the lack of the code of ethics problem with a mean of approximately 2.40. Fourth in rank is having financial 
interest in the client's company with a mean of 2.62. The fifth cause in rank was the provision of non-audit 
services which had an average of 2.81. Finally was the problem of hiring the auditor with an average of the 
answers of 2.84.  
 14 
 
Figure 3: The best ways to enhance the auditor independence  
 
 
According to Figure 3, 83.4% of the participants agree and strongly agree that changing the auditors 
after a set of years would be the best solution enhancing the auditor independence. The data also revealed that 
exactly 72.4% of the participants agree and strongly agree that creating a threat to the auditor by increasing 
the litigation against him would be the best solution to enhance the auditor independence. 62.1% of the 
participants agreed and strongly agreed that to enhance the auditor independence, it would be a good solution 
if the auditor is to be elected and selected by the company's shareholders. Finally, 68.2%of the participants 
agreed and strongly agreed to ban the provision of the management advisory services as a solution to improve 
the auditor independence. Using the mean analysis, it was found that the best solution to enhance and help in 
sustaining the auditor independence out of the four suggested solutions was the auditor rotation. It had a mean 
of 1.96, which means that the majority were strongly agreeing that it is the best solution. Second ranked was 
increasing the litigation solution, with an average of 2.2. Third, comes the election-selection process as a 
solution of the auditor independence with an average of 2.41. Finally, with the least mean of 2.48 was the ban 
of MAS solution it had the least agreed upon solution by the participants. This indicates that the rotation as a 
solution for independence would be highly supported by the auditors as the larger portion of the sample is 
supporting it 
 
From Figure 4, it was found that only 30% of the participants agree and strongly agree that client 
companies in Egypt frequently rotate their auditors. Also the mean for this question was 3.2 indicating that the 
majority disagree that there is voluntary auditor rotation in Egypt. Upon the findings of Question 3 regarding 
the use of auditor rotation as a way to enhance auditor independence, the findings of Question 4 encourage and 
support recommending the adoption of Mandatory Auditor Rotation in Egypt especially since it is not 
voluntarily applied until now.  
 15 
 
Figure 4: The frequency of auditor rotation  
  
 
From Figure 5,   it can be seen that 75% of the participants agree and strongly agree that ARL is the 
most important reason for initiating auditor rotation. The data also shows that 77.4% of the participants agree 
and strongly agree that clients switch their auditors to search for auditors with better reputation. It was found 
that 71% of the participants agree and strongly agree that clients normally switched their auditors to engage 
more experienced auditors. It can also be found from the data that 58.1% of the participants agree and 
strongly agree that the auditor would be switched when the management is changed. The results also show 
that 40.7% agree and strongly agree that clients switch their current auditors to other auditors who are more 
flexible and can allow their earnings management practices. Also it was found that 60.7% of the participants 
agree and strongly agree that a company might rotate its auditor to another one that would provide it with a 
better audit opinion which is an unqualified one. The data also reveals that 57.1% of the participants agree 
and strongly agree that the auditor might be rotated when there are legal disputes and conflicts with the client. 
Finally, it was found that 41.9% of the participants agree and strongly agree that clients change their auditors 
searching for others who take lower fees.  16 
 
Figure 5: The main reasons behind auditor switching  
 
 
According to the mean analysis, it was found that the most of the participants agree that the first 
reason with the lowest mean of 1.92 was the auditor switching to find another one that would provide timelier 
audit opinion and to avoid ARL. The second reason rank was the auditor reputation with an average of 2.03 
meaning that most of the participants agree that the auditor rotation is due to searching for an auditor with 
better reputation. The third ranked reason is the auditor experience with an average of 2.12, meaning that 
most of the participants agree that companies might rotate their auditor to hire a more experienced one. Fourth 
in the rank came the change of the company’s management with a mean of 2.19 as a reason for the auditor 
rotation. With the same mean of 2.57 then comes the search for a better audit opinion (clean one) and the 
litigations problem reasons. Next in rank comes the allowance of earnings management reason with an 
average of 2.59 which indicates that participants agree that clients might rotate their auditors when auditors 
refuse to allow their reporting practices that are not in consistence with GAAP. Finally with the highest 
average of 2.77 comes the lower fees reason. It could be inferred that the majority are least agreeing that an 
auditor would be rotated to find another auditor that would charge them less audit fees. We would conclude 
that from the main causes initiating the auditor rotation is the search for a more experienced and a more 
reputable auditor and for a timelier audit report. This reveals that the auditor switch in Egypt is for improving 
the audit quality.  Actually this indicates that the third hypothesis, the fifth hypothesis and the second 17 
 
hypothesis are supported. However, the first hypothesis, the fourth hypothesis and the sixth hypothesis are not 
strongly supported.  
 
Figure 6: The client attachment to the audit firm  
 
 
Figure 6 shows that 80% of the participants strongly agree and agree that when the audit firm is 
more reputable whether according to size or rank, the client becomes more attached to it. The data also shows 
that 87.1% of the participants strongly agree and agree that when the audit firm is able to release the audit 
opinion and finish the audit process on a timely basis, this makes the client more attached to it. It was also 
found that 77.4% of the participants agree and strongly agree that a client is more attached to the audit firm 
for its lower fees. Finally, the results also showed that 70.9% agree of the participants and strongly agree that 
clients are attached their audit firm, due to its strictness in the application of conservative accounting 
practices.  According to the mean analysis, the most agreed upon reason by the majority of participants was 
the timeliness of issuing the audit opinion with a mean of 1.74 followed by the auditor reputation with a mean 
of 1.80. Then ranked as the third reason, was the amount of fees charged by the audit firm. It had a mean of 
approximately 2.06 meaning that the majority of the participants agree that when the audit firm charges its 
client reasonable fees, they become more attached to this audit firm. Finally in the ranking of importance 
comes being conservative and consistent in following GAAP with a mean of 2.19. It could be inferred that 
most of the participants agreed the least on that when the audit firm is strict in applying GAAP and is 
conservative; this makes the client attached to it, although the concept itself should not be undermined since it 
has an average of 2.19 indicating that auditors agree that it is one of the reasons for attachment to the audit 
firm. 18 
 
Figure 7: The client attachment to the audit personnel (audit partners)  
 
 
From Figure 7, 83.9% of the participants agree and strongly agree that a client would be more 
attached to audit personnel/partner due to his/her experience.  Also it was found that 74.2% of the participants 
agree and strongly agree that a client would be more attached to an audit personnel/ partner for being flexible 
in accepting the client's reporting practices that would sometimes be against GAAP. It also can be inferred 
from the data that 65.5% of the participants agree and strongly agree that a client would be more attached to 
an audit personnel due to increased tenure. This reflects that the majority agreed that the extended tenure 
creates a psychological attachment with audit partner/personnel. According to the mean analysis, it was found 
that participants gave the lowest mean of 1.90 to the experience. This means that the majority are strongly 
agreeing that a client would be more attached to the auditor himself or to the audit team as that auditor 
possesses more experience. The second agreed upon reason is being flexible in accepting the client's reporting 
practices that would sometimes be against GAAP. It had an average of 2.03.The least reason to be accepted 
by the majority is the auditor tenure. It had an average of 2.24; meaning that the participants are in the agree 
zone that the client becomes attached to the auditor or the audit team if they have spent with them longer 
tenure (i.e. many engagements). 
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Figure 8: Presence of other audit firms than the big four  
 
 
Figure 8 reveals that 70% of the participants agreed and strongly agreed that there are many reputable and 
qualified audit firms in Egypt.  
Figure 9, showed that 80% of the participants agree and strongly agree, that the audit firm decides to assign 
an audit partner or team to a certain client based on the degree of the partner or team knowledge about the 
client's business whether due to experience in the field or due to auditing the client before. However it was 
found that 65.5% of the participants agree and strongly agree that an audit partner/ team is assigned to an 
engagement based on the client's desire and request. From the means analysis, it was found that concerning 
the decision of selecting the audit partner/team (personnel) for a repeated engagement, the most agreed upon 
factor by the respondents with a mean of 2.06 is the auditor’s knowledge in the client's business. The other 
factor considered affecting the assigning decision, is the client request of a certain audit team or partner. This 
factor had an average of 2.41, which means that the respondents are also in the agree zone. This conveys that 
sometimes an audit team or partner is assigned to an audit client based on his request for this team or partner 
in specific. It could be inferred from this that clients are attached to the audit personnel, an issue that would 
impair their independence and makes the audit partner rotation suitable in the Egyptian market. 
 
Figure 9: Assignment to Audit Engagements  
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5.  Conclusion  
This paper intended to assess the applicability of the mandatory auditor rotation concept in the Egyptian 
environment so as to enhance the auditor independence and thus improves the audit quality. The model 
introduced to measure the audit quality, used different proxies of the audit quality; the audit report, audit 
report lag, the auditor reputation, the auditor experience, the auditor fees and the earnings management level.  
The long tenure or as referred to in the paper as the long auditor client relationship, is assumed to 
would negatively affect the audit quality by impairing the auditor independence, due to increased familiarity, 
closeness and loyalty to the client,  which in turn would impair the auditor's objectivity and professional 
judgment. However, from the analysis of the questionnaire, it was found that the extended auditor client 
relationship would enhance rather than it would deteriorate the audit quality, due to the increased experience 
with the client’s business and practices. 
From the results also it was found that main cause of the lack of independence problem in Egypt is 
that most of the companies in Egypt are closely held where the stockholders are the managers of the company. 
Theoretically, this would increase psychological dependence and attachment of the auditor with the client 
fearing form being fired or not re-hired for future engagements. Other causes were found for the lack of 
independence of auditors in Egypt were ranked as follows; the lack of existence of a code of ethics that can 
act as a guideline for the auditors during the audit. Then came the absence of a professional organization that 
can govern the duties, responsibilities and rights of auditors, followed by the hiring by management problem 
and finally came the provision of MAS and having financial interest in the client's firm. As solution for such 
lack of independence problem, the auditor rotation was suggested as solution to enhance the auditor 
independence.  
Concerning the reasons for voluntary auditor switching and rotation in Egypt, there was no evidence 
that client companies decided to rotate their auditors for opinion shopping reasons. Concerning switching due 
to experience, it was found that one of the main reasons that forces clients to rotate their auditors is searching 
for another one who is more specialized in the client's field of industry as it was found that the specialized 
auditor has more experience than the non specialized one and this improves the audit quality. As for the 
earnings management proxy of quality, it was found that the earnings management practices are practiced by 
companies operating in Egypt for financing purposes and that the auditors accept such practices and consider 
them as not violating the GAAP. This means that the financial reporting quality in Egypt as based on the 
sample would be lowered by such allowed practices. It was also found that a client becomes attached to the 
audit personnel (partner or team) because they are flexible in allowing such non GAAP reporting practices.  
However there was no evidence that in Egypt, clients switched their auditors to search for another auditor that 21 
 
would allow their reporting practices unacceptable by the GAAP. Concerning the ARL, it was found that the 
most important reason for switching is to search for an auditor who would provide the client company with a 
timelier audit opinion. As for the auditor reputation (as measured by the audit firm size) it was found that 
there are many reputable audit firms in Egypt and that the auditor switching exists to have a more reputable 
auditor. The last audit quality measure, was the audit fees, it was found that there was no evidence that one of 
the reasons that forced the clients to rotate their auditors is searching for a lower fees one. From all of the 
previously stated factors, we can assess that there is no evidence that the current voluntary auditor rotation in 
Egypt is for bad reasons such as for opinion shopping or searching for a lower fees auditor, but it would be for 
good reasons that would improve the audit quality such as searching for a more reputable or more experienced 
auditor.  
Concerning the suitable type of rotation that could be applied in Egypt, the paper finds that the audit 
clients in Egypt would be more attached to the audit personnel (i.e. partner or team) due to their experience 
with them which increases as the audit tenure increases, thus increasing the audit quality. Even more 
sometimes they request their re-hiring in the following engagements from their audit firms. Thus an audit 
personnel rotation would not be beneficial for the audit process as it will decrease the audit quality. However, 
firm rotation would be more preferred for two main reasons; first, it was found that the respondents see that 
there are many other reputable and qualified audit firms in Egypt other than the BIG FOUR, this means that 
there are enough potential substitutes of the same quality for an existing audit firm. Second, it was also  found 
that the audit firms usually assigns audit personnel based on their experience in the client's business industry, 
an issue that will promote the audit quality from the two sides, sustaining independence  and at the same time 
promoting quality by assigning experienced auditors to them.     
From the findings of both the literature as well as the field study, the paper can carry some 
recommendations. First, the application of mandatory auditor rotation in general as a solution for the lack of 
auditor independence problem in Egypt and at the same to make the Egyptian auditing standards and 
regulations coping with the international auditing standards. Second, the application of the mandatory audit 
firm rotation in specific in order to sustain the auditor's independence, to promote the audit quality and to 
enhance the competition in the audit market. Third, establishing professional organizations which would work 
on promoting the auditor's profession through well educating auditors about their duties, responsibilities and 
restrictions on the engagement. Fourth, designing a code of ethics acting as a guideline for auditors to 
maintain their independence, objectivity and UN biasness during their conduct. Finally, banning the 
ownership of stock by auditors and also their employment in their audit client firms as in the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act. However if not banned, the mandatory rotation would also limit the effects of the conflict of interests that 
would arise to the auditor from such employment or ownership, as he/she will be mandatory rotated.   22 
 
In further research, it could be useful to investigate the effects of actually applied mandatory firm 
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